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Wheat Acreage Supply Response under 
Changing Farm Programs 
B. J. Morzuch, R. D. Weaver, and P. G. Helmberger 
Planted wheat acreage supply elasticities are estimated for each of several leading 
wheat-producing states. Estimates of elasticities for the aggregate of these states are 
0. 77, 0.45, and 0.52 for spring wheat, winter wheat, and all wheat, respectively, but there
is considerable heterogeneity among states. Acreage allotments and marketing quotas
appear to have destroyed the role of prices in allocating acreage between wheat and other
crops during the years 1950 and 1954-64. Estimates were obtained using multiple
regression analysis of time-series data for the period 194�74. This period was subdivided
in order to take account of changing farm programs.
Key words: farm programs, regression analysis, supply elasticities, wheat acreage. 
In their survey of agricultural price analysis, 
Tomek and Robinson call attention to the 
difficulties encountered in supply analysis and 
to the inadequacy of the elasticity estimates 
currently available. Supply estimation is par­
ticularly difficult for major commodities sub­
ject to farm programs. These programs change 
every three to five years and tend to compli­
cate supply estimation because relevant vari­
ables and structural parameters may change 
over time. While supply equations must be 
conceptualized under alternative policy re­
gimes, conserving degrees of freedom often 
necessitates approximations that are difficult 
to justify on strictly a priori grounds. 
The need for good estimates of supply elas­
ticities is great, however, and researchers con­
tinue to experiment with alternative ap­
proaches. Developing outlook information, 
predicting the consequences of proposed 
changes in farm policy, analyzing the welfare 
implications of commodity storage, and quan­
tification of spatial equilibrium models are ex-
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amples of research areas that require esti­
mates of supply elasticities. 
The purpose of this paper is to present the 
main results of an analysis of wheat acreage 
supply response. Unlike other studies of 
wheat supply, this study uses futures prices as 
a proxy for expected prices for wheat and 
competing crops. A different acreage response 
equation is conceptualized for each of three 
periods since World War II in light of changing 
farm programs for wheat. Supply equations 
are estimated for each of several major wheat 
states rather than for the nation as a whole. A 
considerable effort was made to measure all 
variables with as much precision as possible. 
Our estimates of structural parameters sup­
port the following conclusions. First, during 
the years when acreage allotments and mar­
keting quotas were not in effect, the response 
of wheat acreage to the price of wheat relative 
to prices of competing crops was larger than 
previous supply estimates would suggest. 
Second, there is a considerable heterogeneity 
in supply response among major wheat­
producing states. Third, farm policy during the 
"quota years" appears likely to have de­
stroyed the role of price in allocating acreage 
between wheat and competing crops. Finally, 
the voluntary nature and substitution and 
other provisions of programs beginning in the 
mid-sixties restored an allocative role to wheat 
price not unlike that under "free market" 
conditions. It appears that policy changes in­
troduced in the sixties were quite successful in 
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 making greater use of the market mechanism
 in resource allocation.
 Our analysis draws upon previous work in
 several important respects, but, at the same
 time, questions some existing research proce-
 dures and results. Gardner has proposed using
 futures prices as proxies for expected prices;
 our findings lend further support for this
 thesis. To take account of farm programs
 Lidman and Bawden inserted several program
 variables in a regression equation, giving little
 attention to the modeling of producer decision
 making in the face of changing programs over
 time. Garst and Miller improved upon the
 Lidman and Bawden work, in effect allowing
 new variables to appear (disappear) and pa-
 rameters to change as programs varied. Their
 decision to include land diversion and set-
 asides as independent variables is of some
 concern, however, in that decisions to plant
 and divert are made simultaneously. Some of
 their independent variables may be endoge-
 nous, thus raising the question of simultaneous
 equations bias. We return to this issue later.
 Garst and Miller and Houck et al. insert price
 as an independent variable, but price is not
 expressed relative to the prices of competing
 crops. Their procedure receives little support
 from economic theory. Unlike the previous
 works of Garst and Miller, Lidman and Baw-
 den, and Houck et al., we do not assume that
 wheat acreage supply elasticities are the same
 for quota and nonquota years. As a final pre-
 liminary, the decision to disaggregate supply
 analysis to the state level stands in contrast to
 previous work and allows greater accuracy in
 the definition of variables. For instance, Lid-
 man and Bawden divided lagged U.S. wheat
 price by a lagged U.S. index of feed grain and
 hay prices received by farmers. This index is
 dominated by U.S. corn prices which, while
 quite appropriate for wheat producers in the
 Corn Belt, would seem to be much less so for
 wheat producers in the plains states.
 Conceptualizing Acreage Response Functions
 under Alternative Policies
 In major wheat-producing areas, farmers have
 flexible production capacity that can be used
 to produce various crops other than wheat,
 including feed grains, rye, soybeans, flax, etc.
 We assume that producers allocate acreage
 among competing crops to maximize expected
 profit.' Under free market conditions, creage
 planted to wheat may be viewed as a function
 of expected crop prices, exogenous input
 prices, variables measuring climatic expecta-
 tions and endowments, the nature and extent
 of fixed-scale factors, and the current state of
 technology. Such a relationship is merely one
 among several reduced-form relationships,
 others being those for output, inputs other
 than acreage, and endogenous input prices
 (Weaver 1978). In addition, theory of the firm
 suggests that the function in question is
 homogenous of degree zero in prices; and in-
 crease in all prices will have no impact on
 planting decisions. This suggests that farmers
 are concerned with relative expected crop
 prices in allocating acreage among competing
 crops and would not respond to a proportional
 change in all expected prices. Although this
 point would seem clear even on an intuitive
 basis, typical acreage response functions esti-
 mated in the past have not been restricted to
 be linearly homogenous in prices.
 A simple wheat acreage response function
 may be hypothesized under these conditions
 as follows:
 (1) WAP = ao + a, ERP
 + a, TREND + E,
 where WAP represents acreage planted to
 wheat; ERP represents the expected relative
 price, i.e., the expected price of wheat divided
 by an index of expected prices for competing
 crops; TREND is self-explanatory; and E is a
 stochastic term. TREND is inserted to capture
 the effects of omitted variables that may have
 exerted systematic effects over time. For ex-
 ample, if technological change has tended to
 increase wheat yields less rapidly than the
 yields for competing crops, then for a given
 ERP, acreage planted to wheat would likely
 decline. In this study, equation (1) is hypothe-
 sized for each of the several major wheat-
 producing states with the variables defined ac-
 cordingly. Because equation (1) makes no
 provision for farm programs, it is hypothe-
 sized for those years during which no pro-
 grams were in effect. These "free market"
 years consisted of 1948, '49, '51, '52, '53, and
 1974. We argue, however, that with suitable
 modifications, equation (1) may also be ap-
 propriate for the years 1965-73.
 I Similar results undoubtedly would follow from a model of
 risk-averse choice. However, where risk measures are indepen-
 dent of expectations, exclusions of these variables will not bias
 our results.
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 The wheat programs for 1965-70 were vol-
 untary (see Cochrane and Ryan). Wheat pro-
 ducers were awarded direct payments if they
 abided by their allotments and idled specified
 minimum percentages of their acreage allot-
 ments. Land diversion was not used in 1967
 and 1968, but for the other years (1965, '66,
 '69, and 1970) land beyond the minimum di-
 versions could be idled for additional pay-
 ments. Wheat producers also were required to
 maintain normal acreages in conservation
 uses. Price supports through the nonrecourse
 loan system still were available to partici-
 pants, but at greatly reduced levels relative to
 earlier years. The strategy of the new pro-
 grams was aimed at allowing wheat output to
 be marketed through normal commercial
 channels. Of considerable relevance to the
 present study were the so-called substitution
 provisions included in both the wheat and
 feed grain programs. The feed grain program
 was similar in essential respects to that for
 wheat. Farmers who participated in both the
 wheat and feed grain programs could substi-
 tute acreage of feed grains for wheat, or wheat
 acreage for feed grains, within the total acre-
 age permitted under both programs. A similar
 provision was open to the producer who had
 an oat-rye acreage base and was willing to
 divert some of that base to conservation uses.
 Wheat could be planted on the oat-rye base
 acreage. Finally, an overplanting provision al-
 lowed the producer to overplant up to 50% of
 the farm's permitted wheat acreage. The ex-
 cess production had to be stored under bond,
 but could be marketed in future years under
 certain specified conditions. The substitution
 and storage provisions together with the vol-
 untary nature of the program allowed consid-
 erable room for farmers to allocate acreage
 among competing crops on the basis of ex-
 pected prices.
 Relative to the 1965-70 programs those for
 1971, '72, and '73 constituted an even smaller
 encumbrance on the allocative role of crop
 prices. Under the wheat and feed grain setaside
 programs for the latter three years, acreage
 diversion (set-aside) was required under most
 options in return for eligibility for direct pay-
 ments. All remaining land, with the exception of
 a conserving base, could be allocated among
 crops in any way the farmer chose. The option
 of voluntary diversion of cropland beyond min-
 imum diversions for additional payments was
 also available to feed grain producers in 1972
 and to wheat producers in 1972 and 1973.
 The above discussion indicates that wheat
producers had considerable leeway in allocat-
 ing land among competing crops over the pe-
 rio  1965-73. Farm programs served mainly to
 p ovide farmers with another cropland alter-
 native, viz., the diversion of land for direct
 payments and other benefits. A wheat acreage
 response function may be hypothesized under
 these conditions as follows:
 (2) WAP = YO + Yi ERP + y2 TREND
 + Y3 RUDC + y4 MAXD + e,
 where ERP and TREND are as explained
 above, RUDC equals an estimated diversion
 payment per bushel divided by the index of
 expected prices for all other crops, and MAXD
 equals the upper limit on the extent of permis-
 sible land diversion. The homogeneity condi-
 tion f r returns to land diverted is maintained
 as in the case for returns to land planted to
 wheat. It is hypothesized that y3 is negative in
 that the higher the relative diversion payment
 rate, the more land would be diverted and the
 less land would be planted to wheat. It is hy-
 pothesized that y4 is negative in that to the
 extent MAXD was actually binding, raising its
 value would have the effect of increasing land
 diversion (Weaver 1978a).
 In order to conserve degrees of freedom we
 assume that ao = Yo, ai = Y1, and a2 = 72. This
 allows using data for the "free market" years
 along with data for the years 1965-73 for es-
 timating the parameters of equation (2). The
 two variables R UDC and MAXD are set equal
 to zero for the "free market" years, a proce-
 dure that disallows acreage diversion during
 those years. Importantly, we are assuming
 that the acreage supply equation has the same
 slope for "free market" years as it did during
 the "land diversion" years. We also assume
 that the coefficients for R UDC and MAXD are
 the same for 1965-70 as for 1971-73. These
 are restrictive hypotheses which, given a
 sufficiently large sample, could be subjected to
 empirical testing. It should be stressed, how-
 ever, that our hypothesis regarding slopes is
 much less restrictive than that maintained by
 previous supply analysts who have assumed
 constant supply slopes between quota and
 n nquota years. To this matter we now turn.
 Beginning in 1954 and continuing through
 1963, the wheat program involved price sup-
 ports, acreage allotments, and marketing
quotas. Producers who did not exceed their
 wheat acreage allotments could place their
 production under nonrecourse loans which in-
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 cluded price support. They were, therefore,
 guaranteed a minimum price for wheat. Farm-
 ers who exceeded allotments and failed to
 store their excess production were subject to a
 penalty tax on the excess marketed. For each
 acre planted (harvested, after 1955) in excess
 of the allotment, the producer was required by
 law to pay a tax equal to the product of his
 weighted average yield over the previous three
 years and a per bushel tax. In addition, for
 some years the future allotment was reduced
 for the farmer who did not comply with his
 current allotment. After 1957, noncommercial
 wheat farmers could harvest thirty acres with-
 out penalty so long as the output was fed on
 the farm. Farmers who planted not more than
 fifteen acres of wheat were exempt from mar-
 keting quota penalties, a provision that was
 attractive to many farmers in the Corn Belt
 who were not mainly wheat producers.
 Given a package of specific program param-
 eters (allotments, penalties, and price sup-
 ports) various responses by producers could
 be rationalized. Agricultural Stabilization and
 Conservation Service data show that in major
 wheat-producing states there was widespread
 compliance with allotments. If penalties were
 sufficiently onerous and all allotments were
 actually binding, then acreage allotment alone
 would determine planted (or harvested) wheat
 acreage, subject to the exception of land di-
 version programs to be discussed in a mo-
 ment, and there would be no basis for includ-
 ing ERP as a relevant variable. In other words,
 the conventional concept of an upward-
 sloping supply simply would not apply. Had-
 wiger (p. 197) argues, however, that "during
 the Benson administration, program rules
 came to be structured somewhat more in favor
 of the noncompliers or violators, to the point
 where the advantage for many producers
 seemed definitely to be in noncompliance with
 the program." He further notes that in 1960,
 the last year of the Benson reign, "43.1 million
 acres of wheat were in compliance on a total
 allotment of 50.6 million acres" (p. 194). The
 15-acre exemption, the 'wheat-for-feed"1
 exemption, and other provisions indicate that
 the relative price of wheat might be a relevant
 variable in determining wheat acreage. On
 balance we are inclined to include ERP as an
 independent variable, but with the expectation
 that its coefficient is likely to be a good deal
 less than for the nonquota years and might in
 fact equal zero.
 The wheat program for 1950 involved acre-
 age allotments. Farmers who xceeded allot-
 ments paid n  penalties but lost price sup-
 ports. Penalties also were dropped in 1964,
 although allotments and loss of allotment his-
 tory were maintained. Importantly, there were
 no ubstitution provisions in either 1950 or
 1964. For this reason, these two years were
 included in the "quota years."
 In addition to direct acreage controls, land
diversion opportunities were offered to pro-
 ducers during many of the quota years. These
 programs required that the allotment be re-
 duced by the number of acres diverted. Land
 diversion introduced an alternative use of the
 allotted wheat acreage, which was constrained
 by a maximum allowable diversion (MAXD)
 and encouraged by a per bushel incentive
equal to a percentage (PERR U) times the loan
 rate.
 The acreage supply response hypothesized
 for the quota years is
 (3) WAP = f0o + P, ERP + 32 WAL
 + /.3 PERR U + 14 MAXD + 4,
 where WAL equals the wheat acreage allot-
 ment, j is a stochastic term, and remaining
 variables are as defined previously. Dividing
 the per bushel payment for land diversion by
 the loan rate is equivalent to using PERRU
 and again invokes the homogeneity condition
 in that only those producers who complied
 with allotments were eligible to participate in
 land diversion programs. Because the sample
 period spans only fifteen years and the number
 of observations is limited, trend was excluded
 from (3). It is hypothesized that P, and /.2 are
 positive and j:3 and 184 are negative.
 Data
 Acreages. The spring wheat states in this
 study are North Dakota, South Dakota, and
 Montana. For any one year during the sample
 period, these three states accounted for a min-
 imum of 76% of U.S. spring wheat production.
 The winter wheat states are Colorado, Illinois,
 Indiana, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Ohio,
 Oklahoma, Texas, and Washington. For any
 one year, these ten states accounted for a min-
 imum of 78% of U.S. winter wheat produc-
 tion. For the spring wheat equations, acreage
 consists of acres planted to both durum wheat
 and other spring wheat. The acreage data
 are taken from various issues of Crop
 Production-Revised Estimates and of Field
 Crops-Revised Estimates by States, both
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 series published by the U.S. Department of
 Agriculture (USDA).2
 Prices. The expected prices for durum
 wheat and for other spring wheat are mea-
 sured by the closing futures prices for the two
 kinds of wheat at Minneapolis on 15 April for
 the contract delivery month of September.
 The expected prices for certain other com-
 modities were measured in an analogous fash-
 ion. Closing futures prices and contract deliv-
 ery months were matched with planting dates
 and harvest dates, respectively, using data
 from Usual Planting and Harvesting Dates,
 USDA. For all winter wheat states, the closing
 futures prices on 30 September for delivery in
 July were used. Chicago quotations were used
 for soft winter wheat, oats, soybeans, and
 corn for grain. Kansas City and Minneapolis
 quotations were used for hard winter wheat and
 rye, respectively. Winnipeg quotations were
 used for barley and flax. The futures prices were
 taken from various issues of the Wall Street
 Journal for the period 1948-74.
 Futures prices are unavailable for a number
 of crops grown in the twelve states. These
 include hay, sugarbeets, corn for silage and
 forage, sorghum for grain, forage and silage,
 potatoes, edible beans, edible peas, mung
 beans, rice, peanuts, popcorn, cotton, clover,
 broomcorn, buckwheat, and cowpeas. One-
 period lagged prices for these crops were cho-
 sen as a proxy for the unobtainable futures
 prices in the construction of an appropriate
 other crops price index corresponding to
 either winter wheat or spring wheat. Price in-
 formation for most crops was taken from vari-
 ous issues of the USDA's Agricultural Statis-
 tics and Crop Values. Prices for crops such as
 hay, corn for silage and forage, and sorghum
 for silage and forage were estimated with the
 assistance of the Statistical Reporting Service,
 USDA.
 A spring wheat price index, its correspond-
 ing other crop price index, a winter wheat
 price index, and its corresponding other crop
 price index, were derived using Divisia
 weights. This approach differs from the
 Paashe or Lespeyres approach in that the
 weights used by the latter two consist of a
 given base period weight, whereas the Divisia
 approach uses weights that change from year
 to year. The attractiveness of the Divisia
 scheme lies in its use of changing weights that
 in turn reflec  the changing importance of
 commodities in terms of both their prices and
 quantities produced (Tornquist). The quantities
 used in the formation of these indices were the
 production figures associated with each crop.
 The sources of data on production are the
 same as for wheat acreages.
 Government programs. The sum of the
 domestic marketing certificate and export
 marketing certificate values for wheat was
 used as the estimated diversion payment per
 bushel for 1965. The domestic marketing cer-
 tificate value and the marketing certificate
 payment rate were used, respectively, for the
 periods 1966-70 and 1971-73. These data are
 taken from Wheat-1978 Program, USDA. Data
 on wheat acreage allotments, diverted acres,
 percentages of allotments used in figuring
 maxima for diverted acreages, and the per-
 centages of loan rates used in figuring diver-
 sion payments during the quota years are
 taken from various issues of Wheat Situation,
 published by the USDA, and from Cochrane
 and Ryan.
 Empirical Results
 Where contemporaneous correlation exists
 among the error terms in a set of equations,
 generalized least squares (GLS) estimation of
 all equations taken together yields more
 efficient estimates than does ordinary least
 squares (OLS) estimation of each equation
 separately (Kmenta, pp. 517-29). Because of
 number of observations available and the
 number of parameters to be estimated there
 were insufficient degrees of freedom for GLS
 to be used.
 Equations (2) and (3) were estimated by
 OLS for spring wheat in three states and
 winter wheat in ten states for the period
 1948-74. Estimates for equation (2) are given
 in table 1. These estimates indicate that acre-
 ag  planted to wheat was quite responsive to
 the relative price of wheat in nonquota years.
 The estimated coefficients for ERP are posi-
 tive in all cases. The t-ratios range from 0.42 to
 6.62 and exceed 1.8, the critical value at the
 5% level of significance using a one-tailed test,
 in eight of the thirteen cases. Where the
 Durbin-Watson (D-W) statistics are low (e.g.,
 Montana and Colorado), t-ratios are probably
 high.
 Price elasticities vary considerably across
 states. Elasticities range from 0.61 to 0.95 for
 2 Interested readers may write to the senior author for data used
 in the analysis.
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 Table 1. Wheat Acreage Response Functions, Major Wheat Producing States, 1948-49, 1951-
 53, and 1965-74
 Regression Coefficients (with t-Ratios)a
 Own-Price
 State CONST ERP TREND RUDC MAXD R2 D-W Elasticity
 North
 Dakota 3.250 5.900 -.326 -.018 -.082 .87 2.09 .71
 (1.76) (3.98) (-1.94) (-.72) (-.21)
 South
 Dakota 1.273 2.127 -.125 -.073 -.046 .98 1.55 .99
 (3.14) (6.62) (-1.25) (-13.75) (-.49)
 Montanab 3.577 .673 -.244 -.085 -.102 .80 .54 .27
 (1.67) (.42) (-.78) (-3.06) (-.35)
 Colorado 2.863 .581 -.032 -.031 -.071 .74 1.02 .22
 (4.70) (1.22) (-.13) (-3.04) (-.33)
 Illinois .721 .938 .053 - .003 -.138 .52 1.69 .61
 (.76) (1.20) (.16) (-.23) (-.66)
 Indiana .285 1.107 -.033 -.007 -.152 .75 1.76 .93
 (.40) (1.88) (-.10) (-.80) (-.93)
 Kansas 9.360 4.522 -.242 -.116 .161 .81 1.76 .41
 (4.60) (2.71) (-1.04) (-3.24) (.21)
 Montanac 1.200 .259 -.007 -.057 -.387 .71 1.16 .13
 (1.12) (.32) (-.04) (4.24) (-1.81)
 Nebraska 3.191 1.207 -.168 -.060 .002 .90 2.00 .37
 (4.54) (2.00) (-.86) (-5.98) (.01)
 Ohio .573 1.408 -.111 -.025 -.116 .82 1.93 .95
 (.63) (1.92) (-.30) (-2.21) (-.54)
 Oklahoma 3.112 2.380 -.284 .018 .140 .69 2.56 .46
 (3.23) (3.52) (-1.12) (.93) (.33)
 Texas 3.414 2.105 -.268 -.028 -.192 .58 1.61 .46
 (2.64) (1.87) (-.56) (-.97) (-.29)
 Washington 1.421 .637 -.273 .025 .054 .47 1.35 .29
 (2.81) (1.75) (-1.03) (2.81) (.31)
 a The dependent variable is acreage planted to spring wheat (North and South Dakota, Montana) or to winter wheat (remaining states
 including Montana); CONST is the constant term; ERP is the ratio of the expected price of wheat to the index of expected prices for other
 crops; TREND has gaps for missing years; RUDC is the ratio of the diversion payment per bushel to the index of expected prices for
 crops other than wheat; and MAXD is maximum allowable acreage diversion. See text for details.
 b Spring wheat.
 c Winter wheat.
 the three Corn Belt states and from 0.22 to
 0.46 for the remaining winter wheat states.
 This is not too surprising in that one might
 expect an inverse relationship between extent
 of specialization and elasticity of acreage re-
 sponse. Acreage elasticities were relatively
 high for North and South Dakota. It may be
 noted that the spring wheat states tend to be
 less specialized than major winter wheat
 states.
 Aggregate supply elasticities were estimated
 as weighted averages using mean acreages for
 individual states as weights. Montana was ex-
 cluded. (In much of our statistical work, the
 estimates for Montana were neither consistent
 with expectations nor with the results for
 other states.) The aggregate acreage supply
 elasticities for spring wheat, winter wheat, and
 all wheat combined are 0.77, 0.45, and 0.52,
 respectively. Previous acreage supply elas-
 ticities by Garst and Miller (p. 34) for spring,
 winter, and all wheat are 0.04, 0.19, and 0.17,
 respectively. The elasticity reported by Houck
 et al. (p. 37) equalled 0.39. Over the period
 1954-70, Lidman and Bawden (p. 331) found
 that lagged wheat price was not significant in
 explaining acres planted to wheat. In most of
 their formulations the estimated coefficient for
 price was, in fact, negative.
 Although the estimated coefficients for
 R UDC and MAXD tend to be negative, as
 expected, the t-ratios are low. Yet we know
 that ubstantial acreages were diverted under
 major programs during the period 1965-73,
 and it would seem strange indeed if these idled
 acres did not reduce at least to some extent
 acreage planted to wheat. The low t-ratios
 may be the result of the high levels of correla-
 tion observed between RUDC and MAXD.
 Moreover, it may well be that the land diver-
 ion programs in question were too complex to
 be represented adequately by the inclusion of
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 Table 2. Wheat Acreage Response Functions, Major Wheat Producing States, 1948-49, 1951-53,
 and 1965-74
 Regression Coefficients (with t-Ratios)a
 Own-Price
 State CONS T ERP TREND DIV R2 D- W Elasticity
 North Dakota 2.549 6.375 -.017 -.225 .82 1.63 .77
 (1.37) (4.02) (-.31) (-1.36)
 South Dakota .284 2.954 -.131 -.106 .95 .82 1.40
 (.25) (3.17) (-6.18) (-.59)
 Montanab -.581 3.740 -.109 .128 .64 .71 1.50
 (-.25) (2.09) (-1.66) (.32)
 Colorado 2.770 .690 - .060 -. 175 .77 1.08 .26
 (6.25) (1.93) (-3.21) (-1.14)
 Illinois 1.098 .636 -.001 -. 140 .59 1.81 .41
 (1.47) (1.03) (-.09) (-1.55)
 Indiana 1.158 .406 -.010 -.332 .88 1.88 .34
 (2.50) (1.07) (-1.06) (-4.30)
 Kansas 10.721 3.528 - .231 -.265 .81 2.16 .32
 (6.95) (2.75) (-3.29) (-1.63)
 Montanac 1.219 .244 .107 -.277 .49 .81 .13
 (1.35) (.35) (3.12) (-1.50)
 Nebraska 3.639 .884 -.109 -.166 .91 2.61 .27
 (6.51) (1.84) (-5.96) (-2.66)
 Ohio 1.770 .466 - .043 -.584 .90 2.28 .31
 (2.59) (.85) (-3.12) (-3.71)
 Oklahoma 3.885 1.827 .024 -.172 .65 2.31 .36
 (4.72) (3.04) (.61) (-.75)
 Texas 3.847 1.818 -.078 -.151 .54 1.59 .40
 (3.63) (2.02) (-1.57) (1.11)
 Washington 1.901 .296 .035 -.089 .30 1.22 .14
 (4.81) (1.01) (1.94) (-.27)
 a All variables are defined as in table 1 except DIV equals acreage diverted under both the wheat and feed grain programs. See text for
 details.
 b Spring wheat.
 C Winter wheat.
 but two variables. For example, the two pro-
 gram variables do not take account of mini-
 mum diversion, payment rates for additional
 diversion, allotments, and several other pro-
 gram details that were likely of some impor-
 tance in determining planted wheat acreage.
 While further work on this problem may be
 useful, the number of observations is limited
 in light of the number of parameters that might
 require estimation in models more compli-
 cated than those considered here.
 As part of our exploration, equation (1) was
 modified by the inclusion of diverted acres
 (DIV) as an independent variable. The vari-
 able DIV equals the land diverted under both
 the feed grain and wheat programs and was
 zero for the free market years and nonzero for
 the years 1965-73. As noted previously, in-
 cluding DIV as an independent variable risks
 simultaneous equations bias in that diverted
 and planted acreages are probably endogenous
 in any reasonable model of producer decision
 making.
 Alternatively, the estimates of equation (1)
 modified by including DIV may be unbiased if
 it is assumed that the expected value of the
 dependent variable is conditional on all inde-
 pendent variables including DIV.3 On this in-
 terpretation, applicable to the estimates dis-
 cussed below much as it is to the previous
 results of Garst and Miller, the estimated equa-
 tion can be used only in prediction if knowl-
 edge of an estimate of the extent of land diver-
 sion is available prior to planting times.
 Clearly this approach, aside from problems of
 application, is less powerful than one which
 involves estimation of the reduced forms of a
 structural model.
 Estimates of equation (1) modified by the
 inclusion of DIV are given in table 2. Again,
 the results for ERP are impressive judged by
 the usual economic statistical criteria. The as-
 sociated aggregate acreage supply elasticities,
 again excluding Montana, are 0.90, 0.32, and
 0.46 for spring wheat, winter wheat, and all
 3 For a presentation of the relevant theorems and a brief
 critique, see Malinvaud (pp. 614-17).
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 Table 3. Wheat Acreage Response Functions, Major Wheat Producing States, 1950 and 1954-64
 Regression Coefficients (with t-Ratios)a
 State CONS T ERP WAL PERRU MAXD R2 D- W
 North Dakota -.211 -.188 1.009 -.797 .115 .85 1.40
 (-.12) (-.17) (4.70) (-.42) (.36)
 South Dakota -1.963 .210 1.337 .076 -.100 .78 2.51
 (-1.37) (.22) (3.58) (.06) (-.17)
 Montanah -2.555 -1.310 1.616 1.297 -.115 .45 1.61
 (-.77) (-.46) (2.00) (.45) (-.13)
 Colorado -1.933 -2.620 3.098 4.379 -2.165 .73 1.12
 (-1.17) (-3.50) (3.75) (2.71) (-2.97)
 Illinois 1.550 -.226 .270 .990 - .663 .69 2.55
 (5.061) (-1.11) (1.18) (2.97) (-2.25)
 Indiana .752 - .067 .516 .857 - .780 .57 2.09
 (2.49) (-.29) (2.73) (2.373) (-1.95)
 Kansas 4.103 -2.678 .962 7.429 -1.088 .56 1.65
 (.82) (-1.14) (2.34) (1.34) (-1.64)
 Montanac 5.543 -1.581 -.341 -2.543 .775 .55 1.79
 (4.60) (-1.53) (-1.01) (-2.19) (2.13)
 Nebraska 1.145 -.837 1.014 1.221 -.418 .82 4.33
 (1.37) (-i .74) (5.28) (1.47) (-1.29)
 Onio .296 - .338 1.023 1.069 -.759 .82 3.58
 (.932) (-1.41) (5.41) (2.74) (-2.43)
 Oklahoma 1.421 -1.642 1.185 2.700 -.784 .66 1.90
 (1.01) (-2.29) (3.28) (1.68) (-1.89)
 Texas 2.905 -2.241 .947 2.809 -1.017 .85 1.22
 (2.88) (-2.11) (5.19) (2.22) (-2.64)
 Washington 1.508 -1.468 1.144 .659 -.336 .90 2.13
 (4.95) (-6.40) (6.96) (1.96) (-1.59)
 a The dependent variables, ERP. and MAXD are the same as in table 1. CONST is the constant term; WAL is the wheat acreage allotment:
 and PERRU is the percentage of the loan rate used in figuring diversion payments. See text for details.
 b Spring wheat.
 c Winter wheat.
 wheat, respectively. The estimated coeffi-
 cients for DIV are negative in all cases except
 for spring wheat in Montana. The t-ratios tend
 to be small, but the pattern of results across
 states seems encouraging and the magnitudes
 of the estimates appear reasonable. Thus, for
 example, for every 100 acres diverted under
 the wheat and feed grain programs, the acreage
 planted to wheat fell by twenty-two acres in
 North Dakota and twenty-six acres in Kansas.
 The estimated coefficients are strikingly simi-
 lar for Nebraska, Oklahoma, Texas, and Col-
 orado.
 Turning to the quota years, the estimates for
 equation (3) are given in table 3. The impor-
 tance of wheat allotments in determining
 planted wheat acreage during the quota years
 is remarkable. Excluding winter wheat in
 Montana, the estimated coefficients for wheat
 allotments (WAL) are positive for the remain-
 ing twelve cases. For eight of these twelve
 cases the t-ratios for WAL exceed 3.0. For
 several states the estimated coefficient is close
 to unity, indicating that a one acre increase in
 allotments was associated with a one acre in-
 crease in planted acreage.
 A second conclusion is that acreage planted
 to wheat did not respond positively to the rela-
 tive price of wheat. The coefficients for ERP
 are negative in every case except one. The
 t-ratios are low in the majority of cases. Sim-
 ple correlation coefficients between ERP and
 each of the program variables were very low
 with only a few exceptions. Adding trend to
 the equation does not alter the pattern of un-
 expected signs for ERP. These findings may
 reflect the downward movement of the na-
 tional average support price for wheat (loan
 rate) from $2.24 per bushel in 1954 to $1.30 in
 1964. The negative sign for ERP may reflect an
 empirical regularity growing out of the evolu-
 tion of farm policy. In any event, the hypothe-
 sis, implicit in previous work, that the acreage
 supply function during the quota years has the
 same slope as during the nonquota years
 would appear to have received a near-fatal
 blow.
 Finally, although the estimated coefficients
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 for MAXD have the expected signs in most
 cases, the same cannot be said for PERRU.
 While we are unable to explain these results it
 is possible that the high correlation between
 PERR U and MAXD prohibited measuring the
 separate effects of each with much precision.
 On balance, however, the findings do not lend
 much support to the view that diversion pro-
 grams reduced significantly the acreage
 planted to wheat during the quota years. This
 conclusion was also supported by further
 statistical work in which MAXD and PERR U
 were deleted from (3) and a land diversion
 variable was added in their place. In the re-
 vised formulation, the estimated coefficients
 for land diversion were negative in seven
 cases and positive in six. Once again, the es-
 timated coefficients for ERP were mostly
 negative.
 Implications for Future Work
 Three suggestions for future supply analysis
 may be offered on the basis of findings dis-
 cussed above. First, futures prices appear to
 merit consideration as an alternative to using
 distributed lags in modeling price expectations
 for economic research. Second, spatial heter-
 ogeneity and the opportunity for measuring
 variables with greater precision might well
 make disaggregation at least to the state level
 well worth the extra costs of data collection
 and analysis. Third, because farm programs
 change over time and may have profound im-
 pacts on the nature of supply response, it is
 important to structure analysis to allow for
 changes in relevant variables and in param-
 eters, including elasticities, over sample pe-
 riods.
 [Received January 1979; revision accepted
 September 1979.]
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